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Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History
DAVID LUBAN* & W. BRADLEY WENDELt
ABSTRACT
The modern subject of theoretical legal ethics began in the 1970s. This brief
history distinguishes two waves of theoretical writing on legal ethics. The "First
Wave" connects the subject to moral philosophy and focuses on conflicts between
ordinary morality and lawyers' role morality, while the "Second Wave" focuses
instead on the role legal representation plays in maintaining and fostering a
pluralist democracy. We trace the emergence of the First Wave to the larger
social movements of the 1960s and 1970s; in the Conclusion, we speculate about
possible directions for a Third Wave of theoretical legal ethics, based in
behavioral ethics, virtue ethics, or fiduciary theory.
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INTRODUCTION
The English Whig historian Thomas Babington Macaulay, who trained as a
lawyer, archly questioned the willingness of a lawyer, "with a wig on his head,
and a band around his neck [to] do for a guinea what, without those appendages,
he would think it wicked and infamous to do for an empire."' Never mind the
guinea. What kind of person, merely upon occupying a social role, feels free to
set aside universal human duties and virtues? In one way, this problem about the
lawyer's role morality is among the oldest of all philosophical questions, going
back to Plato's critique of the Sophists. Remarkably, though, very few modern
jurists-and, for that matter, very few moral philosophers-wrote about the
professional ethics of lawyers in the century before the 1970s. There were
platitudes aplenty,3 but little sustained theoretical analysis.4 In the 1970s, though,
something unexpected happened. There was a sudden outpouring of articles and
books on theoretical legal ethics, which gave birth to the modern subject. Its
origin and rapid development is a fascinating piece of intellectual history, which
1. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xxi (1988) [hereinafter LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE]
(quoting THoMAs BABINGTON MACAULAY, Francis Bacon, in 2 CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 290, 317 (1926)).
2. See, e.g., PLATO, Gorgias (W.D. Woodhead trans.), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 229 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961). By "role morality" we mean the moral obligations and permissions
associated with social roles-for example, the lawyer's moral duties of confidentiality and zeal, as well as the
lawyer's moral permission to promote client interests even at the expense of worthier ones.
3. Former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark chaired a special committee for the American Bar
Association (ABA), subsequently known as the Clark Commission, to study lawyer discipline. It has been
called the starting point for the revolution in the field of legal ethics. See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C.
Clark's Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 35 (2005). However, Justice Clark's
best-known contribution to the field as a sole author is notable mostly for its pious generalities, such as asserting
that the most important lesson of Watergate is that intellectual and moral integrity are important, and that the bar
has devolved from a noble profession to a profit-seeking business. See Hon. Tom C. Clark, Teaching
Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 249, 250-52 (1975). Unfortunately, much of the commentary on
legal ethics, even (or particularly) by distinguished bar leaders and judges, had this homiletic quality.
4. The sole exception was Lon Fuller, a great legal philosopher at Harvard University; but his writings on
legal ethics in the 1950s and 1960s were largely ignored in the scholarly world. Mostly, they still are. See
generally David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801 (1998), reprinted in
REDISCOVERING FULLER: ESSAYS ON IMPLICIT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren
van der Burg eds., 1999).
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also tells us a great deal about the profession as it has evolved since then. This
commemoration of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics is an apt occasion to
examine this history. Father Robert Drinan, founder of the Journal, welcomed the
theorists. (One of us, Luban, recalls getting a phone call from Father Drinan, who
with his usual infectious enthusiasm began "Hi, this is Bob Drinan. What do you
think of my journal?" At that time, we had met only once.) Father Drinan's vision
was a journal that would address practical problems, not only theoretical ones,
but he fully understood how deeply entwined practical legal ethics is with theory.
Father Drinan understood as well that the revived interest in fundamental moral
problems connected with the lawyer's role put wind in the sails of legal ethics
scholarship and made the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics not only necessary
but possible.
The short history that follows is selective, and-we wish to emphasize-very
personal to the two authors. Other participants in the evolving discourse of
theoretical legal ethics would no doubt tell the story in a very different way. We
don't apologize for offering a personally inflected history; we do apologize to
scholars whose work we have overlooked. Given space constraints and the desire
not to get too deep into the weeds of these debates, we make no claim to being
comprehensive in this survey. In particular, there are many important scholars
whose work has been left out of our history. Furthermore, the story we tell is
mostly a U.S. story. For reasons that we don't entirely understand, philosophical
legal ethics flourished in the United States more than a decade before it attracted
interest internationally.
In what follows, we identify two "waves" of theoretical legal ethics scholar-
ship, one that views the profession through the lens of moral philosophy, and a
later wave that criticizes the moral philosophy orientation and approaches the
profession through political philosophy. Roughly (but only roughly), the first
wave focuses on the individual lawyer as a moral agent, and addresses the moral
tension between ethical life and the lawyer's role morality that Macaulay's quote
highlights. The second wave focuses instead on legal representation as a political
institution within a pluralist democracy, and links legal ethics to the requirements
necessary for the profession to help sustain pluralist institutions. Chronologically,
the first wave began in the 1970s and the second wave in the 2000s-but this too
is very rough: the two schools of thought overlap in time more than the "two
waves" metaphor suggests.
In our Conclusion, we speculate briefly on current themes in scholarship that
may represent a third wave of theorizing about legal ethics.
I. THE FIRST WAVE: LEGAL ETHICS AS A PROBLEM OF MORAL PHLOSOPHY
A. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The first wave of scholarship and reflection grew out of the larger social and
political ferment in the 1960s and 1970s. This was the time of the civil rights
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movement, the time of Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X and the struggle
for racial equality. It was also the beginning of the modern feminist movement.
Importantly, it was also the time of the Vietnam War and the anti-war movement.
To a great many people, young and old but mostly young, the Vietnam War
proved, once and for all, the moral bankruptcy of American Cold War liberalism,
with its slow progress on equality at home and its aggressive interventions
abroad. That led to powerful political mistrust of the Establishment. This was
also the era of the counter-culture. Notably, the counter-culture rebelled against
conformism and careerism, which they thought were soul-deadening. Institutions
became suspect, and that included legal institutions. Individual conscience,
according to this world-view, must always trump institutional demands.
The widespread attitude of all these movements, both the political and the
cultural, was therefore anti-authoritarian and intensely moralistic. Looking back,
we can say that perhaps the movements lacked a political vision-like many
social movements, they knew what they were against without knowing exactly
what they were for. No doubt the movements were also too moralistic and too
self-righteous. The fact remains that in this time of turmoil, an anti-authority
stance seemed to many people like the bare minimum that human decency
required.
The law schools were hardly immune to these larger currents in U.S. society.
The New Left in the legal academy was active by the mid-1970s, and in 1977 the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies held its first organizational meetings.
Critical Legal Studies aimed at a radical critique of legal institutions based on the
fundamentally moral ground that the law had become an enemy of an authentic
and empathetic community. As Robert Gordon put it in a well-known paper about
Critical Legal Studies published the same year the Georgetown Journal of Legal
Ethics was founded,
CLS is a movement mostly of law teachers, but also including some
practitioners, which started for most of us in the late 1960s or early 1970s out of
a sense of dissatisfaction with our own legal education. We hoped to produce
some work about law that would try to make clear and convincing our felt
uneasiness, and to work those inchoate feelings of dissatisfaction into a critique
5. On the political side, perhaps the best exemplar is the Port Huron Statement, the founding manifesto of
Students for a Democratic Society for example:
The goal of man and society should be ... finding a meaning in life that is personally authentic: a
quality of mind not compulsively driven by a sense of powerlessness, nor one which unthinkingly
adopts status values .... Personal links between man and man are needed, especially to go beyond
the partial and fragmentary bonds of function that bind men only as worker to worker, employer to
employee, teacher to student, American to Russian.
Students for a Democratic Soc'y, The Port Huron Statement (1962), http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/hst306/
documents/huron.html [https://perma.cc/YU9E-4VR3]. On the counter-cultural yearning for something outside
of institutions, there is no better exemplar than Timothy Leary's 1967 mantra "turn on, tune in, drop out." A
useful history is TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (rev. ed. 1993).
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with some cogency and content .... But at the same time it is a movement in
pursuit of some shared political and social objectives .... [W]e are united in
that we would like our work, in so far as it is possible, to help in modest ways to
realize the potential we believe exists to transform the practices of the legal
system to help make this a more decent, equal, solidary society-less
intensively ordered by hierarchies of class, status, "merit," race, and gender-
more decentralized, democratic, and participatory both in its own forms of
6
social life and in the forms it promotes in other countries.
Not coincidentally, Gordon is among the most distinguished legal ethicists, and
his paper The Independence of Lawyers counts among the classics of the
theoretical literature. Even though relatively few legal academics and lawyers
joined Critical Legal Studies, a great many sympathized with CLS, and even
more sympathized with the vision of the larger social movements.8
It is worth mentioning that the clinical education movement arose during the
same period of social ferment and calls for reform-and some of the most
distinguished theoreticians of legal ethics are, or began their careers as, clinical
scholars.9 The close connection between clinical education and the development
of theoretical legal ethics is fascinating, but it would take another article to
explore the many complications in this chapter of the history.
B. THE CRITIQUE OF THE "STANDARD" NEUTRAL PARTISANSHIP
CONCEPTION
Notably, two of the founding scholars of theoretical legal ethics identified with
the left social movements of the time. Richard Wasserstrom, who is now eighty
6. Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 195,
196-97 (1987).
7. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers].
8. For example, in the early 1980s, the Conference on Critical Legal Studies claimed 350 members, while its
1982 annual conference drew 1,000 participants. Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and
the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama ofAmerican Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 199, 201
(1984). Similarly, our impression is that a large number of the scholars whose work appears in Kennedy and
Klare's 1984 bibliography of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholarship would identify themselves as crit
sympathizers but not necessarily as crits. Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal
Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984). This includes several prominent legal ethicists: Howard Lesnick, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, and Deborah L. Rhode; others, Richard Abel, Robert S. Gordon, and William H. Simon, are
more closely and directly identified with CLS. One of us (Luban) would place himself in the ranks of the
sympathizers. See the title essay in DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM (1993). Another (Wendel) self-
consciously identifies with pre-CLS movements such as the legal process school. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel,
The Craft of Legal Interpretation, in INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT: FROM THE RULE OF
THE KING TO THE RULE OF LAw 153 (Yasutomo Morigiwa ed., 2011).
9. There are, indeed, too many to name, and we won't try. We will merely mention several of the prominent
theorists who began or continue in the clinical world: Anthony Alfieri, Gary Bellow, Clark Cunningham, Kate
Kruse, Peter Margulies, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Abbe Smith, and Paul Tremblay. A classic account of the
origins of clinical education is Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM.
L. REv. 581 (1976).
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years old, is a philosopher, law professor, and civil rights lawyer of great
eminence (now retired). In 1975 he published a paper, titled Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues,"o that launched philosophical legal ethics.
Wasserstrom worried that the lawyer's role "renders the lawyer at best
systematically amoral and at worst more than occasionally immoral in his or her
dealings with the rest of mankind," and he questioned whether one-sided loyalty
to clients can be reconciled with the universalism inherent in the moral point of
view. Remember that Kant claimed that every human being, indeed every rational
being, must be treated as an end in him- or herself, not merely a means to your
own end." By contrast, the lawyer's job is to treat the client as an end in himself,
but nobody else. As two other scholars put it rather savagely, "When one desires
help in those processes whereby and wherein people are treated as means and not
as ends, then one comes to lawyers, to us." 1 2 They added: "Thus, if you feel the
need for a trope to express what a lawyer largely is, perhaps this will do: A lawyer
is a person who on behalf of some people treats other people the way
bureaucracies treat all people-as nonpeople." 1 3 Even Macaulay was barely this
nasty.
Wasserstrom wrote in a calmer and more dispassionate spirit. He raised hard
and fundamental questions about the lawyer's role morality, but he did not claim
to answer them. He saw the other side as well. He was fully aware that social
roles and one-sided loyalties are deeply woven into the fabric of human morality,
and always have been. Consider the social role of a parent. Parents favor their
own children over other people's children, and it would be very strange if
universal morality condemned parental favoritism, which is basic human nature.
Universal morality has its claim on our moral imagination, but so do social roles.
The problem is figuring out how to reconcile these claims. 14 Even though
Wasserstrom did not solve the problem, the very fact that he raised it resonated
with the social movements of the time: he questioned established roles on
basically moral grounds. Notably, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues
also raised the question of whether lawyers are overly paternalistic to their
10. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1 (1975) [hereinafter
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals].
11. Most famously in IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
(THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT) 79 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996), AK.
4:428.
12. Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 581
(1977).
13. Id.
14. Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'
ETHICS 24, 26-27 (David Luban ed., 1983); see also LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 105-16
(exploring the tension between a morality of roles and a morality that rejects the claims of roles). Another
pioneering work on professional ethics (including legal ethics) that focuses on the problem of role morality is
ALAN GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980) [hereinafter GOLDMAN, MORAL
FOUNDATIONS]. See also MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION (1980).
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clients, another question about lawyers' roles that has become a staple of
theoretical legal ethics.1 5
Three years later, William Simon, a young law professor associated with
Critical Legal Studies, published a brilliant 100-page article, titled "The Ideology
of Advocacy." 1 6 It was a fierce critique of traditional advocacy ethics. He began
by providing the first precise definition of what has been called the "neutral
partisanship" model or the "standard conception" of legal ethics.1 7 The standard
conception, which was the target of much of the critical attention by philosophers
in the emerging legal ethics scholarship, generally lists three principles: (1)
partisanship (zealously pursuing the client's lawful interests); (2) neutrality (not
taking sides regarding the moral merits of the client's ends); and (3) non-
accountability (being exempt from moral criticism for having helped another act
immorally)." Simon reviewed the main positions in U.S. legal thought that tried
to justify the standard conception-legal realism, legal process theory, and the
defense of client autonomy-and argued that none of them succeeds. Further-
more, he warned that by surrounding the law with a fog of technicality and
mystique that only legal experts can understand, lawyers alienate their clients
from the law. They substitute their own definitions of client problems for the
subjective experiences of the client. In place of professionalized advocacy,
Simon proposed a kind of deprofessionalization, where the lawyer's personal
moral convictions would play a central role in determining how far to go on the
client's behalf.19 Years later, Simon abandoned deprofessionalization, but at the
time it seemed like a promising idea.20 Wasserstrom, too, had flirted with a
15. See, e.g., David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454; Katherine R.
Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103 (2010) [hereinafter Kruse,
Beyond Cardboard Clients].
16. William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 29 [hereinafter Simon, Ideology].
17. Id. at 36-37. Murray Schwartz provided a similar definition concurrently with Simon. See Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978). The main
difference is that where Simon emphasized the Principle of Neutrality, Schwartz emphasized the Principle of
Moral Nonaccountability. To the best of our knowledge, the label "standard conception" of legal ethics
originated in Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63, 73 (1980),
another of the pioneering essays in First Wave theoretical legal ethics. But see Ted Schneyer, Moral
Philosophy's Standard Misconception ofLegal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529 [hereinafter Schneyer, Standard
Misconception] (arguing that there is nothing standard in the so-called "standard conception" as moral
philosophers understand it).
18. See, e.g., Tim DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE
LAWYER'S ROLE 5-12 (2009) [hereinafter DARE, COUNSEL OF ROGUES]; see supra text accompanying note 17
(addressing that different scholars produced somewhat different formulations of the neutral partisanship model,
with Simon emphasizing neutrality rather than moral nonaccountability).
19. Simon, Ideology, supra note 16, at 130-42.
20. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998) [hereinafter SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE];
Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 230 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). For
an early critique of deprofessionalization, see Postema, supra note 17, at 71-73.
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deprofessionalized model of the lawyer's role. 21 Both of them, in this respect,
were attracted by the counter-culture's critique of conformism.
There followed a veritable flood of writing on the themes that Wasserstrom,
Simon, and a handful of others introduced. This was what we call the "First
Wave" of legal ethics scholarship. One of us (Luban), is a proud member of the
First Wave and reports that it was very exciting. It felt like a time of discovery-a
time in which real intellectual progress was being made on some of the deepest
questions in moral and legal philosophy. 2 2 Instead of asking abstract conceptual
questions, scholars were looking at the working lives of lawyers, and that seemed
like exactly the right direction to go. It still seems that way. Stanford law
professor Deborah L. Rhode, another influential First Wave scholar, combined
theory and sophisticated multidisciplinary analysis of regulatory issues such as
the bar's moral character requirement and its prohibition on unauthorized
practice.2 3 Moreover, she gave attention to the necessary institutional aspects of
the emerging field, such as casebooks, professional centers, and mentoring junior
scholars. Rhode and Carrie Menkel-Meadow were also among the first theorists
to bring an explicitly feminist perspective to legal ethics.2 4 Harvard law professor
David Wilkins situated legal ethics within American legal thought more
generally, including the law and economics, legal process, and, importantly, legal
realist traditions.2 5 Wilkins also raised crucial questions about the connections
between race and role-asking, for example, whether a black lawyer could, as a
moral matter, represent the Ku Klux Klan.26 (The connections between race and
the lawyer's role have been pursued by Anthony Alfieri in a great many
publications. 2 7 )
21. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals, supra note 10, at 22-24.
22. Luban's major First Wave statement is LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985);
Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981). For more theoretical work, see, for example,
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L REv. 589 (1985); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE (2000).
24. See Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1988); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985). See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829
(1990).
25. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1992); David B. Wilkins,
Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1990).
26. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku
Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030 (1995); see also David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The
Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1981 (1993). Not
incidentally, in the status-conscious world of the legal academy, the fact that junior scholars at Harvard and
Stanford would at the start of their careers self-identify as legal ethicists was important to the legitimacy of the
field.
27. Here, as befits the occasion, we cite two that appeared in the pages of this Journal: Anthony V. Alfieri,
Objecting to Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129 (2014); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out ofTurn: The Story of
Josephine V, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991).
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Also during the First Wave of scholarship, religiously affiliated scholars, most
prominently Thomas Shaffer, asked about how specifically Christian lawyers
should act within their role.28 (Scholars writing from the Jewish tradition have
posed similar questions. 2 9) A Christian lawyer may wonder, for example, whether
it is possible to be a lawyer without being involved in the fallenness of all human
institutions, including the law. 3 0 Because the answers to questions formulated in
these terms would themselves be dependent upon theological commitments, the
influence of the religious-lawyering literature was somewhat limited. Its wider
impact depended upon its translation into what Rawls would call public reasons,
in which case it risked losing its distinctive prophetic voice.3 1
Shaffer, we might add, does not come from the progressive and counter-
cultural milieu we have previously identified as an inspiration for some of the
First Wave. He is a former dean of Notre Dame Law School, and those who read
his 1971 article defending property rights against "liberal bias," or his blistering
critique of liberal democracy, might mistake him for the conservative gentleman-
lawyer he often writes about. 3 2 Yet Shaffer (who describes himself as "left of
center" and criticizes the gentleman-lawyer's penchant for patriarchy 3 3 ) has
come to explicitly identify with some of the most radical strains in Christianity, a
kind of Book of Acts Christianity that Shaffer himself describes as "countercul-
tural": economic egalitarianism, opposition to coercive power, suspicion of
patriotism as a kind of idolatry.34 His vision of legal ethics is equally radical: it
involves lawyers taking on a relationship of ministry to their clients, which he
28. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981) [hereinafter SHAFFER, ON
BEING A CHRISTIAN]; Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089 (1998);
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987); see also Howard
Lesnick, No Other Gods: Answering the Call of Faith in the Practice of Law, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 459 (2002).
For a noteworthy recent contribution to the religious lawyering literature, see ROBERT K. VISCHER, MARTIN
LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE AND JUSTICE (2013).
29. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, To Save a Life: Why a Rabbi and a Jewish Lawyer Must Disclose a Client
Confidence, 29 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1771 (1996); Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer:
Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577 (1993); David Luban, A
Midrash on Rabbi Shaffer and Rabbi Trollope, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 889 (2002), reprinted in DAVID LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 301 (2007); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal
Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443 (1999).
30. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, A Meditation on Vocation, in RADICAL CHRISTIAN AND EXEMPLARY LAWYER:
HONORING WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW 129 (Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. ed., 2006); see also STANLEY HAUERWAS,
AFTER CHRISTENDOM?: HOW THE CHURCH IS TO BEHAVE IF FREEDOM, JUSTICE, AND A CHRISTIAN NATION ARE BAD
IDEAS (1st ed. 1991).
31. Shaffer, who was deeply influenced by the Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder, warns religious
lawyers that acting as a prophet might lead the world to view you as a kook. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a
Professional Elder, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 624, 640 (1987).
32. Thomas L. Shaffer, Men and Things: The Liberal Bias Against Property, 57 A.B.A. J. 123 (1971); see
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 13, 24 (1991).
33. SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 32, at 36 n.1, 51-58.
34. Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Up for Simon's Practice of Justice?, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 903, 907-10 (1999).
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describes in rather terrifying terms: "The scene to superimpose on the jail cells
where we talk to the guilty is Jesus and the tax-gatherers. The scene to
superimpose on the frightful image of my client receiving his punishment is
Dismas on the cross, Dismas with an advocate and a companion hanging by his
side." 3 5 As for the neutral partisanship model, Shaffer calls it "the unique, novel,
and unsound adversary ethic." 3 6
C. DEFENDERS OF A (MORE OR LESS) STANDARD CONCEPTION
Not everyone in the First Wave of philosophical legal ethics was a critic of the
standard conception. Traditional advocacy also had its defenders. A first, and
deeply original, defense was offered by Charles Fried, who coined the striking
metaphor of the "Lawyer as Friend." 37 Fried argued that a lawyer is like a
special-purpose friend of the client. Morality allows us to favor our friends over
other people, as long as we don't violate the rights of third parties. Relationships
with certain individuals-paradigmatically, family and friends-become impor-
tant, constitutive aspects of a person's life. It follows that morality permits us to
favor the interests of those with whom we are in particularly close, personal
relationships over the more abstract commitment to the well-being of humanity
as a whole. As the client's friend, the lawyer adopts the client's interests as his
own, for adopting your friend's interests as your own is part of the classical
definition of friendship. 38 Furthermore, because the lawyer works within a legal
system, she is not directly responsible for damaging outcomes the system
produces-"the wrong is wholly institutional," in Fried's words.39 It is not a
personal wrongdoing by the lawyer. As the saying goes, "don't hate the
player-hate the game."
In response, Fried's critics argued that he drew the wrong conclusion from his
"lawyer as friend" analogy. One pointed out that if you adopt your friend's
interests as your own, that makes you morally responsible for them. 4 0 Simon
went even further in criticizing Fried. Emphasizing that normally the lawyer
takes money for becoming the client's friend, Simon complained that Fried had
given the classical definition not of friendship, but of prostitution.41 Dauer and
Leff believe that Fried's conception of friendship-adopting the friend's interests
as your own-captures only a thin slice of what friendship is about, and the result
is that "a lawyer is like a friend ... because, for Professor Fried, a friend is like a
35. SHAFFER, ON BEINGA CHRISTIAN, supra note 28, at 79.
36. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REv. 697 (1988).
37. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
38. Id. at 1071.
39. Id. at 1085.
40. Susan Wolf, Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics ofLaw, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 14, at 59 n.4.
41. Simon, Ideology, supra note 16, at 108.
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lawyer." 4 2 Despite these critiques, many lawyers today continue to see the
attraction of Fried's vision, because it corresponds with an authentic experience
of representing clients. One of us (Luban), has witnessed this again and again
among clinic students, for example those who represent poor people seeking
political asylum and women who are victims of domestic violence. The students
often become intensely wrapped up in their clients' lives, so much so that their
teachers warn them about the importance of maintaining boundaries. They truly
are lawyers as friends, although perhaps not in the sense that Fried had in mind.
A second powerful defense of the standard conception emphasizes that lawyers
enhance their clients' autonomy before the law. 4 3 An autonomous person chooses
her own ends. The lawyer's role is to assist clients in doing what they have every
right to do: pursue their ends to the limit set by the law, even if the lawyer thinks
the client's ends are reprehensible. Assisting clients this way is an essential job in
a rule of law regime, because the law is opaque and hard for laypeople to
understand. All the lawyer is doing is helping clients do what they have
autonomously chosen to do, and which the law permits them to do. That is clearly
a good thing and a noble calling.
The late Monroe Freedman gave the autonomy argument a distinctive
grounding in the American Constitutionj which may have limited the influence
of his work internationally, but which resonates powerfully with lawyers,
particularly the criminal defense bar. For Freedman, the criminal defender's
all-in ethic of adversarial zeal on behalf of the client is grounded in the Fifth
Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-
and, ultimately, the individual's autonomy rights against state force that these
doctrines embody. In his famous paper on the "three hardest questions" for
criminal defense lawyers, Freedman argued that the duties owed to clients-
confidentiality and competent representation-should have priority over the duty
of candor to the tribunal. Lawyers, therefore, should permit clients to testify
perjuriously.4 5 This position was so scandalous that then D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals Chief Judge Warren Burger, along with two other federal judges,
actually filed disciplinary grievances against him.4 But Freedman never wavered
42. Dauer & Leff, supra note 12, at 578.
43. This argument is articulated forcefully in Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
44. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). Freedman, later
with co-author Abbe Smith, prepared a student textbook that is actually a sustained argument for the view that
the fundamental role of lawyers is to vindicate the Constitution's protection of the rights of individuals against
the state. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (5th ed. 2016).
45. See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). The other two "hardest questions" concern the destructive
cross-examination of an opposing witness who the lawyer knows is telling the truth, and explaining the law to
the client, knowing that the client will tailor his story to the available defenses.
46. See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133 (2008)
(recounting this history).
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from the view that, if a lawyer's obligations are in conflict, then the duty to
protect her clients should take precedence. Abbe Smith, who joined Freedman
as co-author of Understanding Lawyers' Ethics, has offered equally powerful
defenses of the criminal defender's role, although Smith bases them not only on
autonomy rights but also on a critique of the criminal justice system.4 8
The autonomy argument is powerful, but in our view it is not decisive.4 9 To see
why (briefly departing from our historical narrative), consider a notorious case
that has been discussed frequently in the legal ethics literature, the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device products liability litigation.5 0 The Dalkon Shield caused
infections that sterilized thousands of women. Although the litigation centered on
whether the product was defective, defense counsel theorized that certain sexual
and hygienic practices were an alternative causal explanation for the pelvic
inflammatory disease suffered by the plaintiffs. To defend the cases, the
company's lawyers devised a brutal but effective tactic, which became known as
the "Dirty Questions List." During the pre-trial discovery, they asked the women
graphic and even humiliating questions like: "How often did you have anal sex?"
and "When you go to the toilet, do you wipe from back to front?" They also asked
them for the names and addresses of all their sex partners "other than your
husband," presumably so those partners could be questioned on the same intimate
subjects. The lawyers argued that the "dirty questions" were relevant to the legal
question of causation, because they might reveal alternative sources of pelvic
infection. Unfortunately, the judge agreed and permitted the questions.
In reality, everyone understood that the real purpose was intimidation-to
warn the women that if they went forward with their cases, they might be
humiliated by having to answer the "dirty questions" in open court. One woman
complained that the questions were "like an obscene telephone call."5 She
answered them anyway, but many other women abandoned their cases. That was
exactly what the company wanted-so the lawyers' intimidation tactics suc-
ceeded. The defense lawyers made the conscious choice to assist the client using
the "dirty questions" strategy. Why should they be excused from moral blame for
their autonomous choice to harm and humiliate injured women? They will
47. In one sense, however, Chief Justice Burger prevailed: he wrote the unanimous opinion in Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), which held that a lawyer who warned his client that the lawyer would inform
the court if the client testified perjuriously did not violate the client's Sixth Amendment rights.
48. See generally FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 44; Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for
Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 925 (2000).
49. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 637; David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1035-43 (1990).
50. See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAw 24-26 (2010) [hereinafter WENDEL, FIDELITY
To LAw]; David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 29, at
35-36; DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 669 (2d ed.
1998).
51. RONALD J. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY 19-20 (1990).
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respond indignantly: "No no! All I was doing was defending my client's
autonomy." But that is not all they were doing. The "dirty questions list" did two
things: it defended the client's autonomy and it harmed and humiliated the
innocent. You cannot assert half the act description but reject the other half. In
fact, the "dirty questions" intimidation tactic defended the client's autonomy by
harming and humiliating the innocent, so the two halves of the act description are
bound together as closely as flesh and blood.
The question of whether act descriptions done within the lawyer's role can be
translated into act descriptions in ordinary moral terms is a fundamental one in
professional ethics. After all, there is a big difference between wielding a knife in
a street fight and an operating room; one is maiming, the other is surgery. The
question is a major theme in a significant work on professional ethics-Arthur
Applbaum's Ethics for Adversaries.5 2 There are numerous intelligible descrip-
tions that can be offered of the questioning in the Dalkon Shield case, including:
A man asking creepy, intrusive questions about a stranger's sexual practices; a
man trying to intimidate a victim from seeking redress; or, a lawyer obtaining
evidence to support a defense in a civil lawsuit. Which of these is the appropriate
description? We know, from John Searle among others, that the social practices in
which acts are embedded can change the description of the acts.53 Familiarly,
certain acts such as "hitting a single" are possible only within the social practice
of baseball. As Applbaum argued, however, the possibility of giving an
institutional act description, such as "taking a deposition," does not magically
erase the description in ordinary moral terms, like "dirty questions" and
"humiliating"-no more than the description "home run" would magically erase
the description "breaking a nearby window" when a sandlot ballplayer hits a long
ball that travels a tad too far.54
The Dalkon Shield case reveals another problem with the autonomy argument.
Here, the defendant was not a natural person but a corporation. We may agree
with Kant that autonomous choice is the highest human faculty, the source of
human dignity. The same can hardly be said about a corporation, which is a
juridical person but not a moral person, and which has no human dignity.5 5 (As
52. ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999) [hereinafter APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES]. The relevant chapter was
originally published as Arthur Isak Applbaum, Are Lawyers Liars? The Argument of Redescription, 4 LEGAL
THEORY 63 (1998). For other notable contributions to the role morality literature by moral philosophers outside
the legal academy, see GOLDMAN, MORAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14, at 1-33, 90-155; Alan Gewirth,
Professional Ethics: The Separatist Thesis, 96 ETHICS 282 (1986); Michael 0. Hardimon, Role Obligations, 91
J. PHIL. 333 (1994); Judith Andre, Role Morality as a Complex Instance of Ordinary Morality, 28 AM. PHL. Q.
73 (1991); Mike W. Martin, Rights and the Meta-Ethics ofProfessional Morality, 91 ETHICS 619 (1981).
53. See, e.g., JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995).
54. APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES, supra note 52, at 91-98.
55. A corporation can own an act, but not own moral responsibility for an act. See DAVID LUBAN, TORTURE,
POWER, AND LAW 291 (2014) [hereinafter LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER, AND LAW] (acknowledging Amy Sepinwall's
use of this distinction). Luban observes that his argument has never attracted much support:
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the saying goes, a corporation has no soul to damn, no body to kick.) Its officers
and directors have autonomy in the moral sense, but they are not the lawyer's
client. 6 It seems, then, that the autonomy argument is weak when the client is an
organization.
The First Wave highlighted a third defense of the standard conception, which
has its origins in the adversarial structure of adjudication. Adversary argument
seems like the best way to find the truth, and partisan advocacy seems like the
best way to defend the individual's rights-or so the argument goes. The search
for truth and the defense of rights are social goods of enormous importance. If
partisan advocates are essential instruments for finding truth and defending
rights, shouldn't that be enough to justify the lawyer's role? Monroe Freedman
championed this line of argument in his 1975 book Lawyers' Ethics in an
Adversary System, but it appeared as early as 1958 in a quasi-official report
co-authored by the great legal philosopher Lon Fuller-arguably the first-ever
modern article on theoretical legal ethics. 7 One of us labeled this argument the
"adversary system excuse," and in an early paper found it at best only a weak
pragmatic justification for what lawyers do.5 " The problem with the adversary
system excuse is that it is only as good as the adversary system, which is an
imperfect truth-seeker and rights-defender. Adversarial argument works best
when lawyers are arguing issues of law, not issues of fact. When judges decide
questions of law, hearing both sides of the questions argued in their most forceful
In Lawyers and Justice, I argued that the organizational attorney-client privilege should be
abolished, because organizational clients are not subjects with human dignity, and the privilege costs
society too much by facilitating corporate cover-ups. The argument, which I naively regarded as
among the strongest in my book, attracted no subsequent discussion, not even criticism. Apparently
my recommendation was too fanciful to take seriously.
David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders ofHuman Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It), in LEGAL ETHICS
AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 29, at 87. The deafening silence may be due to the fact that lawyers don't think
the attorney-client privilege has much to do with human dignity, least of all in the organizational setting. As the
Supreme Court stated in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the purpose of the privilege is to
allow a free flow of confidential communications between attorney and client so that the attorney can learn all
the relevant facts and then provide advice to the client on how to comply with the law. Norman Spaulding has
recently developed a historical and normative critique of Upjohn, contending that the function of the privilege is
to reinforce a moral division of labor; the attorney and client can deliberate confidentially about the legality of a
proposed course of conduct, but then it is the client's decision whether to comply with the law. See Norman W.
Spaulding, The Privilege of Probity: Forgotten Foundations of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 301 (2013); Norman W. Spaulding, Compliance, Creative Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A Theory of
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2013 J. PROF'L LAW. 135. This may be an interesting variation on the traditional
dignitarian argument for an organizational attorney-client privilege, which serves to reinforce the moral and
legal accountability of corporate managers.
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
57. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958) [hereinafter Report of the Joint Conference].
58. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 14, at 83. Luban revised
and corrected this essay, and would refer interested readers to the later version, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY, supra note 29, at 19.
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form will almost certainly help the judges decide more intelligently. In purely
legal arguments there are no confidences or secrets to conceal and no witnesses to
impeach-there is a relatively pure dialectic of arguments carried on in the open.
It is different when lawyers argue about factual matters. There, the advocate's
job is to protect the client's secrets and cast doubt on the other side's
evidence-even if the advocate knows that the truth lies with the other side. Does a
system with that design feature do a good job of finding truth? There are reasons
to doubt that it does. The best efforts by empiricists to answer that question are
inconclusive, for an obvious reason: when the system fails to produce the truth, it
remains hidden, like buried treasure or dark matter. Therefore we will never be in
a position to say "the system fails five percent of the time (or ten percent, or
twenty percent)." How could we know? But consider a common sense argument.
Suppose you face a crucial life decision, for example a choice between two
attractive but very different job possibilities. If the adversary system really is the
best method of finding the truth, you would ask friends, or hire lawyers, to
investigate the possibilities, and then use every trick in the litigator's bag to try to
persuade you of one or the other-tricks that might include efforts to suppress
important facts. The ironically named discovery process in civil litigation can be
abused by lawyers who play games like asserting frivolous objections and
assertions of privilege, artificially narrowing the scope of responsive information,
and burying "hot documents" in thousands of pages of irrelevant dreck. 5 9 It is
obvious that no sane person would make a life decision in such a perverse way.
Thus, whatever permission lawyers have to take a highly partisan stance when
arguing legal questions, it would seem that more of an attitude of neutrality is
called for when dealing with facts. 0
To summarize the First Wave of theoretical scholarship in four sentences, it
holds:
(1) Legal ethics is not only a matter of legal doctrine; at its most basic
level, it is a subject in moral philosophy.
(2) The principal question it must answer is how to reconcile the
lawyer's professional role morality with "ordinary" or "common"
morality, when they seemingly conflict.
(3) The role morality centrally involves a "standard" conception,
according to which lawyers must zealously advance the client's
lawful ends, while maintaining moral neutrality toward those ends
and the lawful means used to pursue them-and, furthermore, that
59. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and
Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 773 (1998).
60. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth? Objective and Subjective Perspectives on Truthfulness in
Advocacy, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105 (2016).
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lawyers are morally unaccountable for any "collateral damage" they
inflict in their representation.
(4) The arguments about role morality circle around the moral impor-
tance of the client-lawyer relationship, the value of client au-
tonomy, and the moral significance of the adversary system.
II. THE SECOND WAVE: FROM MORAL TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
A. SECOND WAVE BASICS: THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN A
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY
So the arguments went, back and forth, during the First Wave of philosophical
reflection on legal ethics. These debates persist. But time moves on, and minds
move on. In the last two decades, a fresh generation of scholars entered the arena
and took the field in a new direction.6 ' They argued that the question that
preoccupied the First Wave-how can role morality be reconciled with universal
morality?-or, as Charles Fried posed it, "Can a good lawyer be a good
person?" 6 2 -iS simply the wrong question. It treats legal ethics as a subject
within moral philosophy. But the lawyer's role is not really an aspect of ordinary
moral life, like the role of parent or neighbor. It is fundamentally institutional-
part of a scheme of political institutions and practices that has the governance of
the community as its end. Generalizing from an ordinary moral relationship such
as friendship, as Fried did, misses the point that the legal system is impersonal
and bureaucratic in a way that friendships are not. Fried's critics saw this as a
fatal flaw in his analogy, and it very well may be, but it can also be seen as the
starting point for a different normative perspective on the lawyer's role. The
difference between natural friendship and political "special-purpose" friendship
is one of the insights that motivated what may be called the Second Wave of
philosophical legal ethics.
Second Wave accounts begin with the political purpose of the legal system in a
pluralist society. By a pluralist society, we mean a society of people with many
different, sometimes competing, moral and religious beliefs. Concrete decisions
must be made about a wide range of matters of importance to the community, yet
citizens of that community disagree about what constitutes a good life, what ends
are worth pursuing, and what facts bear on the resolution of these controversies.
Such a society faces what Rawls calls the burdens of judgment.63 If pluralism
means anything, it is that rational people's judgments, even about very basic
61. See Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 16
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 45 (2003) (recognizing this emerging theme in scholarship); Katherine R. Kruse, The
Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 493 (2011) (assessing second-wave legal ethics
scholarship from an insider's perspective).
62. Fried, supra note 37.
63. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54-58 (1993).
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matters, cannot be expected to agree-hence the "burden" that judgment carries,
namely that reason and rationality do not yield unique right answers on contested
moral and political questions.
In products liability and consumer protection, for example, one can imagine a
range of reasonable but conflicting views about what should be a manufacturer's
responsibility for the well-being of consumers, given the benefit of the product to
consumers and the background risks to which users of a product are exposed in
any event. But there must be some basis for manufacturers and consumers to
form long-term expectations about product safety and the liability of manufactur-
ers-otherwise there will be fewer beneficial consumer products and medical
devices available. The solution to this problem is the establishment of a political
process that creates laws and legal institutions for the peaceful and orderly
resolution of conflicts.6 4 This apparatus is what is sometimes called an
"institutional settlement"-and every society requires an institutional settlement
to survive and prosper. Notably, our institutional settlement includes the law of
lawyering, including rules of ethics and procedure, among its elements. Even if
we don't like the results the settlement produces in an individual case, the very
existence of society requires us to abide by the settlement anyway.
If lawyers refuse to represent clients because they have moral objections to the
clients' ends, they are violating the terms of the institutional settlement. Of
course, a lawyer has a right to refuse a client on moral grounds. But refusal
should be an exceptional event. Otherwise, lawyers are imposing their own moral
views on their clients, and when they do that they are dishonoring the pluralism
of society-the very same pluralism that democratic legal systems exist to
preserve. Preserving pluralism provides a powerful reason for a lawyer not to
engage in moral deliberation about the client's ends or the lawful means used
to pursue it. In the language of legal theory, it is an "exclusionary reason"-a
second-order reason not to engage in first-order moral deliberation.
Less theoretically, respecting the institutional settlement is what practicing
lawyers believe they are doing. Lawyers and practically-minded legal scholars
have sometimes expressed annoyance at what they take to be philosophers'
broad-brush condemnation of advocacy as morally unjustified. 6 One of the
motivations behind Second Wave legal ethics scholarship was to take seriously
the possibility that lawyers may be fully justified in doing what they do, even
64. See, e.g., Scorr J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 213 (2011) (focusing on the moral aim of law to address this type
of problem within political communities).
65. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw 22-23 (1979).
66. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers'Ethics, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 91 (2012); M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to Philosophers about Legal Ethics?, 9 LAw & PHIL. 67
(1990); Schneyer, Standard Misconception, supra note 17; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., My Station as a Lawyer, 6
GA. ST. L. REv. 1 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 751
(2011). An extended critique is Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103
HARV. L. REv. 2009 (1990).
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when it "looks nasty," and then try to work out a philosophical explanation of
how that could be the case.
These are the fundamental arguments of the Second Wave of philosophical
legal ethics, in three sentences:
(1) Legal ethics is a subject in political philosophy, not moral
philosophy.
(2) The political function of legal institutions is to resolve disputes in a
pluralist society.
(3) And that requires lawyers to abstain from moral judgment about
their clients, understand their role of serving as agents of their
clients, and follow the positive legal obligations in the code of
ethics.
You can find this argument set out in books by the New Zealand philosopher Tim
Dare and by one of the co-authors of this Essay (Wendel). 7 But variations on the
argument also mark the writing of other Second Wave theorists, among them
Kate Kruse, Daniel Markovits, Alice Woolley, and Norman Spaulding.6 "
These thinkers are very different from each other. And they do not all defend
traditional advocacy. Wendel, in particular, argues that the fundamental value
lawyers must serve is fidelity to law, not fidelity to clients' goals. 6 9 This is
particularly important when we turn from the lawyer's role as courtroom
advocate to the role of confidential advisor. As an advisor, the lawyer's duty is to
give the client a candid, objective opinion about the law, even if it is not what the
client wants to hear. Of course we know that business clients often want opinion
letters from their lawyers telling them they can do whatever it is they want to do;
but the lawyer must be faithful to the law even if it means the client cannot do the
67. WENDEL, FIDELITY TO LAw, supra note 50; DARE, COUNSEL OF ROGUES, supra note 18.
68. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008); Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Advisor and the
Practice of the Rule of Law, 47 U.B.C. L. REv. 743 (2014); Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence
in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1931 (2007); Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand:
The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 369 (2003); Kruse, Beyond
Cardboard Clients, supra note 15.
69. See WENDEL, FIDELITY TO LAw, supra note 50, at 59 (distinguishing legal entitlements from client
interests, and arguing that only the former are the lawyer's ethical concern). One complication arises when we
recognize that the state's vision of the law, and more specifically the law of lawyering, may be different from the
bar's own, client-centered vision of that same law. Exposing that difference, and warning of its dangers to public
values, is one of the themes of Susan P. Koniak's writing. Koniak is one of the most original theoretical legal
ethicists, and her work does not fall neatly into our First Wave/Second Wave typology. Koniak argues that the
profession's vision of the law is all too often self-serving and obstructionist-for example, placing excessive
weight on client confidentiality at the expense of mandatory disclosure obligations written into public law. Her
fundamental moral critique of the legal profession is that the organized bar is far more interested in protecting
the interests of the powerful than it is in enforcing law designed to protect the weak. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak,
Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrongs with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1
(1995); Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law, and Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1075 (1993); Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992).
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deal. Markovits shares the political premises of Wendel's argument, including the
view that law has "a distinctively political kind of authority" over citizens, which
derives from the capacity of the law to sustain a stable framework for collective
government, notwithstanding the incompatible interests, and plurality of reason-
able moral commitments, of individuals.7 0 But Markovits places considerable
additional emphasis on participation by citizens in the processes of democratic
self-government, an affective sense of solidarity with other members of the
political community, shared ownership of political outcomes, and the transforma-
tive potential of political engagement.
Markovits argues that the primary lawyerly virtue is what he calls "negative
capability." 7 2 This concept, which he borrows from the poet John Keats, suggests
openness to others and the setting aside of one's preconceptions. Keats described
it as "capable of being in uncertainties, [m]ysteries, doubts, without any irritable
reaching after fact and reason."73 Rather than exercising her own judgment, a
lawyer must "efface herself, or at least her personal beliefs about the claims and
causes that she argues."74 For Keats, negative capability is the essential virtue of
a poet, who in Keats's aesthetics must not let her own personality obscure the
poem's subject: perhaps paradoxically, the poet's craft consists of making herself
invisible to let the subject shine through. Many trial lawyers will nod their heads
in agreement: it takes all their skill to make it seem that the client's case is so
powerful that it speaks for itself with no need for a lawyer's skill.
One might object that the world needs "negatively capable" lawyers like a hole
in the head, if negative capability means pushing their own judgment out of the
way.7 5 The root cause of many high-profile scandals in the American legal
profession, including the participation of lawyers in the savings and loan crisis of
the 1980s and the spectacular rise and fall of Enron in the early 2000s, have
been caused by lawyers who "remain content with half knowledge."7 7 Whatever
philosophers may say, law firm liability insurers do not advise lawyers to exercise
negative capability.
70. MARKOVITS, supra note 68, at 174-75.
71. Id. at 176-77, 180-82, 188-89.
72. Id. at 93-95.
73. Id. at 94.
74. Id. at 93.
75. So one of us has argued. See David Luban, Book Review, 120 ETHICS 864, 866 (2010) (reviewing
MARKOVITS, supra note 68).
76. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair. The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's
Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 243 (1998) (criticizing lawyers for their role in
the collapse of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s); Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned From
Enron's Fall: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 35-48 (Feb. 6, 2002) (statement of
Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law) (pointing out role played by lawyers in
the financial accounting scandals of 2002); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1236 (2003) (criticizing the collusive role of lawyers in the Enron scandal).
77. See MARKOVITS, supra note 68, at 94 (quoting Keats's vision of negative capability).
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B. THE LAWYER AS ADVISOR
Perhaps the problem is that even if negative capability is a professional virtue
in a trial lawyer grasping and presenting the client's case, it is a professional vice
in the lawyer's role as advisor. The proper way to characterize the lawyer's role
as advisor arose with terrible practicality in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror
attacks. Lawyers within the U.S. government wrote more than half-a-dozen
secret legal opinions approving CIA torture and other violations of international
law. These written opinions were legally unsound, and some of them are
absurd.7 " The lawyers made the fatal mistake of thinking that their duty was to
give the president and the CIA what they wanted, not what the law actually
required. And the result was an ethical catastrophe.
What exactly was wrong with what the lawyers did? One answer is obvious:
Torture is a grave moral evil, and they took actions that made it more likely that
detainees in American custody would be subjected to torture. 7 9 But that would be
true for anyone; the question for legal ethics is whether there is a specifically
lawyerly vice in the Justice Department memos authorizing torture.8 0 To put it
differently, is the role of the lawyer to push as hard as possible (whether in
litigation, advising, or transactional-planning matters) to allow the client to do
what it wants, or should the lawyer be a kind of public-spirited brake on the
ambitions of clients?
Of course, the "torture lawyers" present a very atypical context of lawyer-
advisors. But the scandal surrounding the torture memos prompted important
reflection on the ethics of the advisor's role that pertains to private practice as
well. Lawyers in private practice often feel the ethical strain in giving clients
"candid and independent" advice that the clients don't wish to hear because it
tells them they can't do what they want to do, even though that is the lawyer's job
under positive law."' And lawyers may confuse their role as advisor with that of
an advocate whose job is to put the most client-friendly spin on the law that the
prohibition on frivolity permits. They may, for example, feel pressed to draft
opinion letters blessing transactions their clients want to undertake even if the
78. See, e.g., HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH'S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2009); Jens David
Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT'LL.J. 193 (2010); David Cole, The Torture Memos: The CaseAgainst
the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/10/08/the-torture-memos-
the-case-against-the-lawyers/ [http://perma.cc/7PTQ-UQM9]; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of
Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 29, at 162-205, expanded in LUBAN, TORTURE,
POWER, AND LAW supra note 55, at 197-253. The memos themselves are reprinted in DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE
MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE (2009).
79. See, e.g., David Luban, A Communicative Conception of Torture, in LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER, AND LAW,
supra note 55, at 111; David Sussman, What's Wrong with Torture?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (2005); Henry Shue,
Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124 (1978).
80. For an affirmative answer, see W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: The
2008 F W Wickwire Memorial Lecture, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 247 (2008).
81. MODEL RULES R. 2.1.
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lawyer doesn't believe the law supports the position. One of Wendel's salient
arguments is that the lawyer's duty of fidelity to law prohibits such shenani-
gans.82 This duty of fidelity to the law flows directly from the importance the
Second Wave places on law as a political institution essential to resolving
disputes in a pluralist society. Without exhibiting fidelity to law, a lawyer will
have a hard time justifying her role-she will be undermining the very institution
to which she appeals to explain why she is setting her own moral beliefs to one
side. 83
C. PROFESSIONALISM AND LEGAL ETHICS
Bar leaders are fond of calling for a "rekindling" of traditional conceptions of
professionalism, which allegedly flourished in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.8 4 They sometimes quote Elihu Root, a lawyer who made a
practice of representing robber barons like Jay Gould, as saying "[a]bout half the
practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients they are damned
fools and should stop."8 5 There is at least some anecdotal evidence that large-firm
lawyers once enjoyed sufficient independence to resist pressure from clients to
82. See, e.g., WENDEL, FIDELITY TO LAw, supra note 50, at 186-87 ("Say you have a dog, but you need to
create a duck on the financial statements. Fortunately, there are specific accounting rules for what constitutes a
duck: yellow feet, white covering, orange beak. So you take the dog and paint its feet yellow and its fur white
and you paste an orange plastic beak on its nose, and then you say to your accountants, 'This is a duck! Don't
you agree that it's a duck?' And the accountants say, 'Yes, according to the rules, this is a duck.' Everybody
knows that it's a dog, not a duck, but that doesn't matter, because you've met the rules for calling it a duck.")
(quoting BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GuYs IN THE Room: THE AMAZING RISE AND
SCANDALOUs FALL OF ENRON 142-43 (2003)).
83. We note, however, that the critique of importing adversary ethics into the non-adversarial context of legal
advice is not unique to Second Wave theory. See, e.g., Report ofthe Joint Conference, supra note 57, at 1160-61
(distinguishing the advocate's and advisor's roles); LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 29,
at chs. 4-5 (analyzing the ethics of the advisor's role and criticizing the torture memos). Doctrinally, it is
implicit in the Model Rules' distinction between the duty of the advocate to press the client's case limited only
by the prohibition on frivolity (Rule 3.1) and the advisor's duty of candid and independent advice (Rule 2.1); it
was explicit in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See MODEL RULES R. 2.1, 3.1; MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3, 7-5 (1980). The pioneering article on the advisor's role is Stephen L. Pepper,
Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J.
1545 (1995).
84. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Professionalism, .... In the Spirit of Public Service:'A Blueprint
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 300 (1987).
85. GERALD W. GAWALT, THE NEw HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVI WAR AMERICA 4 (1984); 1 PHILLIP
C. JESSUp, ELIHU ROOT, 1845-1909, at 132-33 (1938). Root also quite famously stated: "The client never wants
to be told he can't do what he wants to do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it is the lawyer's business to tell
him how." ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-1947, at 667 (1946). Given
Root's clientele, it is likely that the second maxim is more representative of his understanding of lawyer
professionalism. Legal historian Lawrence Friedman contends that lawyers always served first themselves, then
their clients, and last "their conception of that diffuse, nebulous thing, the public interest." LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 639 (2d ed. 1985).
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assist with conduct that was contrary to the public interest. 6 William Simon has
argued that Louis D. Brandeis, in his private practice career before his
appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, exemplified features of the ideal of
professional practice in his day. 87 These include attempting to dissuade powerful
institutional clients from "unjust or antisocial projects" and considering the
interests of third parties with whom their clients were dealing. The specifically
professional critique of the U.S. government lawyers involved in the torture of
detainees would therefore be that they failed to ensure that their advice was
consistent with the public interest. This would supplement, not conflict with, the
criticism in ordinary moral terms of assisting another in committing a grave
violation of human dignity.
For a number of political, social, and structural reasons, ably documented in a
recent paper by Rebecca Roiphe," the traditional conception of professionalism
has collapsed entirely, and lawyers now believe themselves to be permitted, and
even required, to seek any advantage for clients that can be obtained through
means that do not clearly violate applicable law. Nevertheless, a much-discussed
1993 book-in many ways a hybrid of First and Second Wave approaches-
argued for a revitalization of the classical virtue of practical wisdom. That book is
former Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer.8 9 Practical
wisdom for lawyers consists of the capacity to view the client's position
sympathetically but also with detachment. Detachment requires a significant
degree of independence from the client.90 The lawyer must appreciate the client's
point of view without necessarily endorsing it, while also seeing things from the
standpoint of others and taking into account their own interests and commit-
ments. 91 The lawyer is a loyal representative of clients, but she is also a
public-spirited professional who acts to preserve the integrity of the framework
of laws and legal institutions within which the interests of clients may be
realized. 92
Kronman's book was criticized for its frank elitism. Not all lawyers are equally
capable of exercising practical wisdom. To illustrate his professional ideal,
86. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 32-38 (1994); SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR
AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900, at 224 (1991) (noting the Gilded Age
anxiety about the "lawyer as hired man" who does his client's bidding without regard to the demands of justice);
id. at 238 (reporting ABA President Thomas Cooley's opposition to "trusts" and concentration of business
power and wealth).
87. See SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 20, at 128-29.
88. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649 (2016).
89. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
90. Also a theme of the work of Robert Gordon who, despite being primarily a historian rather than a
philosopher, has had considerable influence on philosophical legal ethics. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Why
Lawyers Can't JustBe Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION
42 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Gordon, Independence ofLawyers, supra note 7.
91. See KRONMAN, supra note 89, at 69-70.
92. See id. at 364.
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Kronman chose a number of "lawyer-statesmen" who had alternated periods of
government service with practice in top private law firms.93 But obviously
excellence in the exercise of judgment on behalf of clients is not limited to
famous government officials who become name partners of law firms. Perfectly
ordinary lawyers, in small towns and big cities everywhere, very well might be
able to acquire the distinctive expertise of deliberating well about cases, seeing
them as instantiations of conflicting values, approaching the client's situation
with sympathy and detachment, and ultimately making wise decisions for their
clients. A conception of ethical lawyering that emphasizes the exercise of
professional judgment and the balancing of private and public values may be
attractive if it can be adapted to include lawyers less prominent and powerful than
Robert Jackson, Dean Acheson, and Cyrus Vance.9 4
D. SECOND WAVE RESPONSES TO THE MORALIST CHALLENGE
One area of concern with Second Wave arguments is the extent to which they
seem to require lawyers to abstain from moral deliberation, for the sake of
preserving the institutional settlement of our pluralist society. This is an issue
about which the two co-authors disagree, and we think our disagreement is
symptomatic of the difference between First Wave and Second Wave theoretical
legal ethics-the difference, as we have explained, between treating legal ethics
as a subject within moral philosophy rather than political philosophy.95 The
former approach, recall, asks whether, as a moral matter, a good lawyer can be a
good person even when representing morally disagreeable ends in morally
disagreeable ways. Luban is skeptical that the answer is yes, and proposes an
alternative-"moral activism"-in which the lawyer leaves her moral judgment
switch in the "on" position and engages actively with the client on issues of ends
and means.9 6 The latter points to the importance of lawyers to a legal system that
knits together a pluralist society, and argues that lawyers must suspend moral
judgment of their clients' ends and the lawful means needed to pursue them.97
93. Id. at 11-12, 283.
94. Or at least as one of us has argued. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1167 (2005); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics:
Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615 (2006) (offering a broadly similar
argument).
95. We have explored our disagreements in a number of publications. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal
Ethics as "Political Moralism" or the Morality of Politics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1413 (2008) (reviewing DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 29); David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A
Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1437 (2008); David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV.
673 (2012) (reviewing WENDEL, FIDELITY TO LAw, supra note 50); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics Is About the
Law, Not Morality or Justice: A Reply to Critics, 90 TEX. L. REV. 727 (2012).
96. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 148-74.
97. More precisely, the lawyer must abide by the positive law of lawyering, which requires a lawyer who
cannot get past her moral distaste for the client's cause to withdraw from representation because of a conflict of
interest. Cf MODEL RULES R. 1.7(a)(2), 1.16(a)(1), 1. 16(b)(4); cf also WENDEL, FIDELITY TO LAw, supra note 50.
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The argument for the moralist position is straightforward: fundamentally, our
moral agency is always with us; it is inescapable. It is part of the human
condition. Therefore an advocate can never ignore the damage her representation
inflicts on innocent others. Human solidarity demands no less. Can any reason for
side-stepping moral deliberation be truly exclusionary?
One response is that, no, there is no reason that would be truly exclusionary,
but the bar for opting out of the requirements of a role can be set at a high level.98
On one influential conception of role morality, the occupants of a social role may
opt out if the best way to serve the ends of the role is to do something that is not
permitted by the constitutive rules of the role.99 But that still does not address the
argument that, while settlement of controversy in a pluralistic society may be a
moral good, it is not of such importance that it should underwrite exclusionary
reasons. For Joseph Raz, who brought the idea of exclusionary reasons to the
forefront of jurisprudence, it is a conceptual truth about law that it purports to
have authority, and for something to have authority means to create content-
independent reasons.1 00 This conceptual argument leaves an open normative
question, however-namely, whether it be a good thing to organize a society
around a type of reasoning that requires officials and citizens to "disentangle their
judgments about what was required or permitted by the law of their society from
their individual judgments about justice and morality." 01 How one answers that
question may determine one's affinity for First and Second Wave positions.
A second possible Second Wave response to the moralistic challenge is that
First Wave moralists simply have no plausible moral psychology to back up the
exacting demands they place on lawyers. You cannot lead a professional life in a
constant state of moral arousal, any more than a physician can practice
emergency room medicine in a constant state of sympathetic anguish for the
patients. The traits of character the moralists call for are not functional, realistic,
or desirable. They would make a lawyer a misfit in the teamwork-based setting of
a law firm, and constant moral evaluation of client ends and means assumes
cognitive capacities and moral virtue at an unrealistic level. 1 02
Another possibility for dealing with the alarms and torments brought upon
others by the law, with which both of us have some sympathy, is to emphasize that
public ethics deals with a world characterized by the necessity of compromise.
98. This is Wendel's approach. See WENDEL, FIDELITY TO LAW, supra note 50, at 107 (arguing that the law of
lawyering "creates presumptive, not conclusive obligations").
99. See MORTIMER H. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL
DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES (1973).
100. Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 210 (1994).
101. Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT
To THE CONCEPT OF LAw 411, 413 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
102. Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1065 (2010); cf David Luban, How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1101 (2010).
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Dilemmas in political life, of which the practice of law is a part, are sometimes
incapable of resolution without a sense that there is something disagreeable, even
wrongful, about the resolution, even though the conclusion may be justified.103
Max Weber instructed politicians that "in numerous instances the attainment of
'good' ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of using
morally dubious means" and that "anyone who fails to see this is . . . a political
infant." 1 04 To borrow from the title of Stuart Hampshire's powerful book, being a
lawyer involves experience, not innocence:
[T]hose who incur the responsibility of political power ... should at all times
be prepared for the occurrence of an uncontrolled conflict of duties in situations
which seem to exclude the possibility of a decent outcome, and in which all
lines of action seem dishonourable or blameworthy. This is the point at which
the contrast between innocence and experience becomes indispensable in
ethics. The idea of experience is the idea of guilty knowledge, of the
expectation of unavoidable squalor and imperfection, of necessary disappoint-
ments and mixed results, of half success and half failure. 105
The ethics of dirty hands does not mean becoming inured to the use of morally
dubious means, but to have qualms about the use of morally dubious means-and
to be prepared to judge when dirty hands become too dirty. Only a lawyer who is
hesitant to incur the personal moral costs of engaging in wrongdoing to further
the client's legitimate legal interests, when it is truly necessary to do so, will have
any hope of avoiding wrongdoing when it is not necessary, and of not
rationalizing self-interested conduct as the inevitable moral costs of exercising
public power.1 0 6
CONCLUSION: THIRD WAVE?
We begin this concluding section with an anecdote. In Wendel's first year of
law teaching, he met Luban, whose work he had admired for many years. He was
shocked when Luban said ruefully, "I'm afraid the field of philosophical legal
ethics has been entirely written out, and there's nothing more to say." 10 7 Wendel,
being a contrarian by nature, became determined to prove him wrong, and ended
up contributing, several years later, to the development of Second Wave
scholarship. On a panel at a recent conference, Wendel told that story, and
103. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra
note 14, reprinted in BERNARD WILLIAMS, MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY (1995); Michael Walzer, Political
Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160 (1973).
104. Max Weber, Politics as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 121, 123 (Hans H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948).
105. STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 170 (1989).
106. See Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in MORAL LUCK 62-63 (1980).
107. Luban now considers this one of the dumber things he recalls saying. At least, he hopes he hasn't said
too many dumber things than that.
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concluded by admitting, "I'm not really sure what there is left to say about legal
ethics . . . ." A fellow panelist responded, "Well, that's just the thing you would
say if you were so immersed in working on your own little paradigm that you're
missing all the new things happening around you." 08 Fair enough. We write this
little history as representatives of the First and Second Wave of theoretical ethics,
and claim no special insight into what a Third Wave might look like. But we're
willing to speculate a bit. Here are some questions that we think may be fruitful
areas for future legal ethics scholarship:
1. Behavioral legal ethics. One of the promising developments in moral
philosophy is the cautious incorporation of the findings of the empirical
psychology research on ethical decision-making, of which Jonathan Haidt's work
is probably the best-known example.1 09 Of course one cannot straightforwardly
derive an "ought" from an "is," but ethicists have begun to reconsider traditional
philosophical issues such as motivation, responsibility, character and virtue, guilt
and shame, free will and determinism, and moral luck, with reference to
psychological evidence.110 Lawyers frequently practice in organizational set-
tings, such as law firms or in-house counsel's offices. There is a rich body of
literature on the ways organizational systems, practices, and cultures can foster
unethical behavior."' A few legal ethics scholars have begun to make use of these
findings,1 12 but the booming field of law and psychology suggests there is a great
deal yet to be written about behavioral legal ethics.
108. Thanks, Eli Wald!
109. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and the Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral
Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814 (2001).
110. See, e.g., JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR (2002); OWEN
FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM (1991); Gilbert Harman,
Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error, 99 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SoCY 315 (1999). An encyclopedic overview is the five-volume compendium edited by Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong and Christian Miller: MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND
INNATENESS (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Christian B. Miller eds., 2007); MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE COGNITIVE
SCIENCE OF MORALITY INTUITION AND DIVERSITY (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2007); MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:
THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
ed., 2008) [hereinafter MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY]; MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: FREE WIL
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2014); MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: VIRTUE AND
CHARACTER (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Christian B. Miller eds., 2017).
111. See, e.g., John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF
CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds.,
1996); ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988); IRVING L. JANIS,
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982).
112. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004);
Milton Regan, Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 941 (2007); Andrew M.
Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639 (2015); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean
Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2013); Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased
Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics ofFinancial Risk Taking, 96
CORNELLL. REV. 1209 (2011).
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We do have some hesitations about jumping on the behavioral bandwagon. No
doubt realistic ethics must understand the cognitive and organizational structures
that shape individual moral judgment. But psychologists sometimes lapse into
something like determinism, the view that human moral choice is an illusion.
They sometimes write as though a full understanding of the external situation we
find ourselves in and the internal cognitive biases wired into us would reveal that
what looks like choice is no such thing.1 13 But determinism is only one possible
approach to the problem of free will, which one distinguished philosopher has
described as the hardest problem in philosophy.1 14 We are inclined to think that
determinism is singularly useless in practical reasoning: if you are agonizing
about the right thing to do, the reflection "it's not up to me" is an evasion, and it
obviously won't help you make up your mind. It will simply offer you false
comfort as you follow the path of least resistance. Nevertheless, the behavioral
turn in ethics raises important issues of how we might reorganize practical
structures to minimize the cognitive and emotional strains situations place on our
moral commitments and practical judgment.
The same goes for one of the currently fashionable areas of behavioral ethics:
the application of neuroscience to ethical decision-making. Some have argued
that deep knowledge of which brain structures are active in different modes of
moral deliberation can help us decide which moral theories are true.1 15 We are not
convinced. If, for example, it turns out that different patterns of moral reasoning
cause one rather than another part of the brain to "light up" an fMRI, that counts
as an interesting scientific discovery, but it doesn't tell us anything about the
validity of moral judgments. So, while we are encouraged to think that behavioral
ethics holds promise, we also think there are more and less promising avenues for
pursuing behavioral ethics.
2. Virtue ethics. Every human deed involves an actor, an action, and
consequences; and, over the millennia, philosophical ethics has tended to place
primary emphasis on one or the other element in this triad. Consequentialism
focuses on whether consequences are good or not; deontological theories focus
on the intrinsic character of the act. The approach (dating back to Aristotle) that
focuses on the character of the actor is called "virtue ethics." In recent years
Australasian legal ethicists have engaged in a vigorous debate over the place of
character and virtue in the ethics of lawyers, 16 but with a few exceptions, 1 7
113. See, e.g., MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION 120 (1980)
(declaring that "any reasonable psychologist" believes "all behavior is 'caused' by a combination of antecedent
events and the genetic endowment of the individual").
114. SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON, at vii (1990).
115. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke ofKants Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: NEUROSCIENCE OF
MORALITY, supra note 110, at 35; Joshua D. Greene, Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)
Science Mattersfor Ethics, 124 ETHICS 695 (2014).
116. See JUSTIN OAKLEY & DEAN COCKING, VIRTUE ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ROLES (2001); Tim Dare,
Virtue Ethics and Legal Ethics, 28 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 141 (1998).
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American scholars have not been particularly drawn to the subject. Perhaps that
is because virtue ethics does not lend itself to the casuistry of cases, which is at
the heart of ethical decision-making. Being told that the right thing to do in a
moral dilemma is what the good person would do is less than illuminating, even if
it is true. But we believe that any account of legal ethics that leaves out the actor
and the judgments we pass on the actor misses something crucial, and we look
forward to a virtue ethics that can provide guidance to practical deliberations.
3. Fiduciary theory. The client-lawyer relationship, it is often said, originates
in agency law, because lawyers are agents of their clients. As agents, they are
bound by fiduciary obligations to their clients. The fiduciary relationship is not
only a legal relationship; it is a moral relationship as well-in Cardozo's famous
plummy words from Meinhard v. Salmon, "the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive." These obligations are the fons et origo of legal ethics. In recent
years, scholars have come to recognize that fiduciary obligations-originating in
contract but somehow transcending the arm's-length individualism in classical
contract law-are complicated.11 9 Some parts of the law of lawyering, such as
prohibitions on conflicts of interest, are obviously there to preserve the fiduciary
relationship. Others, such as the prohibition on frivolous legal arguments, or for
that matter the professional commitment to pro bono, seem to have a different
source. We see the analysis of fiduciary obligation in the client-lawyer
relationship as a task for moral and political philosophy.
All three of the topics we have just mentioned-behavioral legal ethics, virtue
ethics, and fiduciary theory-seem to us to raise questions that legal ethicists
have only begun to explore. Whether they will generate a Third Wave of
philosophical legal ethics is not a question we can answer-our crystal ball is
cloudy. For that matter, we don't assert that the questions raised by the earlier
waves of legal ethics have been definitively answered. We are tempted to
conclude with a sign on the desk of a German philosopher: "I can't solve your
problems; my job is to help you enjoy them."
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(2016).
364 [Vol. 30:337
